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Abstract 
Despite the prevalence of therapeutic interventions based on conditioning models 
of fear acquisition, conditioning has been seen by many as a poor explanation of how 
fears develop: partly because research on conditioning has become less mainstream 
and models of learning have become increasingly more complex. This article reviews 
some of what is now known about conditioning/associative learning and describes how 
these findings account for some early criticisms of conditioning models of fear 
acquisition. It also describes how pathways to fear such as vicarious learning and fear 
information can be conceptualised as forms of associative learning that obey the same 
learning rules. Some popular models of conditioning are then described with a view to 
highlighting the important components in learning. Finally, suggestions are made 
about how what we know about conditioning can be applied to improve therapeutic 
interventions and prevention programs for child anxiety. 
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Is conditioning a useful framework for understanding the development and treatment 
of phobias? 
Conditioning as an explanation of phobic responding arose from Watson and 
Rayner’s (1920) famous demonstration that aversive and avoidant responses towards 
a previously neutral stimulus could be learned. In their study, a nine-month old child, 
Albert B, was pre-tested to see whether he was initially fearful of various stimuli 
(including a white rat and the noise made by banging a claw hammer on an iron bar). 
Having established that Albert was not fearful of the rat but was scared by the noise, 
Albert was placed in a room with the rat and every time he touched the rat, or the rat 
approached him, Watson hit the iron bar, thus scaring the child. After several pairings 
of the rat with the loud noise, Albert began to show signs of anxiety when the rat was 
presented without the loud noise. Although Watson himself did not formulate a 
coherent theory of phobia acquisition, the implication from the study was that 
excessive and persistent fear (i.e. a phobia) could be acquired through experiencing a 
stimulus in temporal proximity to some fear-inducing or traumatic event. 
In conditioning terminology, this stereotyped and oversimplified account would 
suggest that the rat was a conditioned stimulus (CS) and the loud noise an 
unconditioned stimulus (US), which is a stimulus that evokes a natural response called 
the unconditioned response (UR): in this case anxiety. Through pairing of the CS and 
US, and the formation of a CS-US association in memory, the CS comes to evoke a 
response called the conditioned response, CR (see Figure 1). Clinically-speaking, 
conditioning at the time had two important characteristics: Equipotentiality and 
Extinction. Equipotentiality refers to the observation that any predictor should be able 
to enter into an association with any outcome; the implication is that a phobia of 
anything can develop provided that it is at some point experienced alongside trauma. 
Extinction refers to the well-demonstrated effect that if a predictor (CS) is presented 
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alone (i.e. without the outcome) after a response has been acquired, then the 
strength of that response will decline over successive trials until the predictor stimulus 
no longer elicits a CR. The implication of extinction for clinical psychology was that 
exposure to the CS (the target of the phobia) without the trauma would allow the 
anxious response to extinguish. This simple idea formed the basis of behaviour 
therapy (see Wolpe, 1961) which even to this day is successful in treating specific 
phobias (Öst, Svensson, Hellstrom & Lindwall, 2001). 
Evidence for Conditioning as a Pathway to Fear 
Although ethical considerations prevent detailed study of the role of conditioning 
in the development of anxiety in childhood, naturalistic studies support the idea that 
conditioning is a mechanism through which fears develop. For example, compared to 
control children, 29 child survivors of a severe lighting-strike showed more numerous 
and intense fear of thunderstorms, lightening and tornadoes (Dollinger, O’Donnell and 
Staley, 1984) and 25 teenage female survivors of a sinking cruise ship also had an 
excess of fears relating to ships, water travel, swimming and water, and their fear 
even generalised to other modes of transport (Yule, Udwin & Murdoch, 1990).  Both of 
these studies support the idea that a single traumatic event can lead to intense fears 
of objects related to the trauma. There is also retrospective evidence that anxious 
children (or their parents) will attribute fears to direct traumatic experiences. King, 
Gullone and Ollendick (1998) reviewed seven studies that had looked at self-reported 
attributions of childhood fear and found that conditioning was endorsed as an 
explanation in 0% (for fear of water) to 91% (fear of dogs) of the children. The 
weighted mean endorsement of conditioning across these studies was 38%. With the 
notable exception of fear of water (in which 78% endorsed a ‘fear at first contact’ 
explanation), nearly all of the endorsements were direct conditioning, learning 
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through observing others (vicarious learning) or through receiving fear-relevant 
information. In fact the weighted mean percentage of children or parents endorsing 
these combined categories was 94%. What I hope to demonstrate in due course is 
that all three of these categories are, in fact, forms of associative learning with the 
same underlying mechanism. As such, conditioning, as a theoretical framework, has 
enormous power to explain how fears develop (at least in terms of phobics’ 
attributions of the origin of their fear). However, before then we shall look at some of 
the criticisms traditionally directed at conditioning as an explanation of fear, and then 
explore some lesser-known aspects of conditioning theory.    
Criticisms of Conditioning as an Explanation of Phobias 
Despite the success of therapies based upon it, conditioning as an explanation of how 
phobias develop has come under fire. Rachman (1977) identified several problems 
with the conditioning model as it stood at the time: 
1. Some phobics cannot remember an aversive conditioning experience at the 
onset of their phobia: Many phobics, such as snake and spider phobics 
(Davey, 1992) and height and water phobics (Menzies & Clarke, 1993a, 
1993b), do not remember an aversive conditioning episode. However, others 
do (e.g. Davey, 1989a, and Dinardo et al., 1988, have shown that dental 
and dog phobics respectively can remember traumatic events). Also, for a 
particular feared stimulus some individuals do remember an associated 
traumatic event while others have no such memory (Withers & Deane, 
1995). Although much of the evidence suggesting that phobics do not report 
traumatic memories is retrospective (often many years after the onset of 
the phobia) and, therefore, prone to memory biases (see King, Gullone & 
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Ollendick, 1998), these findings are nevertheless problematic for simple 
conditioning explanations, which rely on a traumatic learning episode.  
2. Not all people experiencing fear or trauma in a given situation go on to 
develop a phobia: I have already suggested that the memory profiles of 
individuals with the same fears differ. However, there is specific evidence 
that not all people who have traumatic incidents while at the dentist 
(Lautch, 1971) or flying (R. C. B. Aitken, Lister & Main, 1981), or who 
experience severe thunderstorms (Liddel & Lyons, 1978) go on to develop 
phobias. A simple conditioning account of fear acquisition simply cannot 
explain why similar experiences produce phobias in some, but not others. 
3. Incubation: Eysenck(1979) noted that although conditioning theory would 
predict that fear should decrease over successive non-reinforced 
presentations of the CS, the opposite is often true. For example, when a 
spider phobic subsequently comes into contact with spiders, each spider is 
unlikely to be paired with a traumatic event, so fear should decrease 
(extinction), but instead the phobic becomes more fearful of spiders. 
Eysenck called this phenomenon the incubation of fear. 
4. The uneven distribution of fears: the law of equipotentiality already 
described suggests that all stimuli are equally likely to enter into an 
association with an aversive consequence. Consequently, fears and phobias 
should be evenly distributed across stimuli and experiences. However, they 
are not: phobias of spiders, snakes, dogs, heights water, death, thunder, 
and fire are much more prevalent than phobias of hammers, guns, knives, 
and electrical outlets yet the latter group of stimuli seem to have a high 
likelihood of being associated with pain and trauma (see Seligman, 1971). 
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There are also common themes that appear in the fears of ‘normal’ children 
(Ollendick & King, 1991) across different countries (Burnham & Gullone, 
1997; Gullone & King, 1992). In addition, attempts to replicate the ‘little 
Albert’ study have been successful when the CS had some biological 
relevance (Valentine, 1946) but not when the CS was not ecologically 
significant (Bregman, 1932). Relatively recent laboratory studies have also 
shown that people acquire conditioned fear responses more rapidly to some 
stimuli (so-called ‘fear-relevant’ stimuli) such as snakes and spiders than to 
‘fear-irrelevant’ stimuli such as rabbits and flowers (see Öhman & Mineka, 
2001, for a review). 
5. Indirect pathways to fear: Rachman (1968, 1977) noted that fears can be 
acquired not only directly but through verbal information and vicarious 
learning (learning through watching other’s reactions). This observation 
implies that conditioning alone is not an adequate explanation of how 
phobias develop. 
What is conditioning? 
The term ‘conditioning’ can mean many things to many people. Already I have 
used the term to describe a paradigm (Watson and Rayner’s pairing of a rat with an 
aversive outcome), a response (the anxiety acquired by little Albert is said to be 
‘conditioned’) and a theoretical framework or underlying mechanism (I’ve talked about 
conditioning ‘models’). Eelen (1980 – cited in De Houwer, Baeyens & Field, 2005) 
believes that the term can and should be applied to all of these situations and should 
not be tied to a particular dogma (for example, the idea that conditioning effects 
result from automatic rather than conscious processes). As such, in considering 
whether conditioning is a useful framework for understanding the development of 
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phobias I will consider conditioning as an effect (anxiety is an effect of pairing a 
stimulus with trauma) and explore the utility of applying the functional characteristics 
of conditioning (as a procedure) to the development of anxiety. Theories of 
conditioning have changed over the years (and continue to develop), but they all 
agree that learning is driven by an association between stimuli (associative learning – 
see below). As such, I will also consider whether viewing anxiety development in 
terms of associative learning is useful. 
Some Things You Might Not Know about Classical Conditioning 
The conditioning model described until now and the criticisms of it ignore much of 
what is now known about conditioning processes in non-human animals and humans. 
In addition, many widespread myths exist about conditioning which have hindered 
conditioning being taken seriously as a framework for studying the development of 
phobias. However, conditioning research has established a great deal about what 
happens during a conditioning procedure and what factors moderate conditioned 
responses. This section explores some aspects of conditioning (and ignores a great 
many more) that are, perhaps, not widely known within the clinical domain. First, we 
will consider what is learnt during a conditioning episode and the impact of 
experiences prior to a conditioning episode. 
Conditioning is Driven by CS-US Associations 
Broadly speaking there are two possibilities about what happens during 
conditioning: (1) an association is formed between the CS and the UR (i.e. an 
association is formed between the potential phobic stimulus and the organism’s 
reaction to the trauma); or (2) an association is formed between the CS and the US 
(i.e. an association is formed between the potential phobic stimulus and the trauma 
itself). It has been long-established that the later of these is true: both animals and 
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humans tend to learn associations between the CS and US during classical 
conditioning, and it is this association that mediates the CR. There are two reasons to 
think that CRs are mediated by CS-US associations. First, in studies in which the UR is 
prevented, conditioned responses still occur: when the drug curare, which blocks all 
skeletal responses, is used during conditioning, conditioned skeletal responses to the 
CS are still present when the drug has worn off (Soloman & Turner, 1962). Second, 
when the US is revaluated in some way it has an effect on the CR (Rescorla, 1974). 
Rescorla (1974) conditioned a CR using a weak shock as a US in rats. Following 
conditioning, these rats were exposed to a stronger shock than that used during 
conditioning (but bear in mind the CS was not present during these exposures). 
Subsequent presentations of the CS gave rise to greater intensity conditioned 
responses than after conditioning. Rescorla concluded that exposure to the greater 
intensity shocks had led to US-revaluation, that is, the US was re-valued by the 
organism as more aversive than it had been during conditioning. As a result of this 
revaluation, conditioned responses changed accordingly. This experiment 
demonstrates that conditioned responses are mediated by CS-US associations 
(because revaluing the US changes the CR), and that, therefore, conditioned 
responses can be altered by experiences outside of the original learning trials. 
The fact that conditioning is mediated by CS-US associations is now well-known 
in learning (e.g. Davey, 1989b, Mackintosh, 1983) and anxiety literatures (e.g. 
Davey, 1997; Field & Davey, 2001), which is why it is often called associative 
learning. However, this picture of what is learned during conditioning is still overly-
simplistic. In an elegant paper, Rescorla (1988) highlighted several pervasive myths 
about Pavlovian conditioning. One of these myths was that conditioning represents an 
extremely restricted form of learning in which a single stimulus becomes associated 
with a single outcome. As we shall see in due course, conditioning is a much more 
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complex process in which past learning and contextual variables are accounted for. 
During conditioning, associations are formed between representations (which 
themselves can include relations generated by other associations) of multiple events. 
As we shall see, conditioning, far from being a simple learnt association between two 
events, is a complex process providing an organism with a detailed representation of 
its environment. 
Conditioning Depends on Past Experience 
Organisms do not enter conditioning episodes as tabula rasa, instead they bring 
with them information about prior experience, and prior relationships between CSs 
and USs. Several conditioning phenomena illustrate this fact. One such phenomenon 
is blocking (Kamin, 1968). In a typical blocking paradigm there are two groups of 
animals. The first group experiences a set of conditioning trials in which a CS (CS1, a 
light perhaps) predicts a US. The second group does not receive these trials. In the 
second stage both groups experience a compound stimulus (CS1 and CS2, the light 
and a tone) predicting the US from stage 1. These experiments show that the pre-
exposed group show reduced conditioned responding to CS2: the fact that CS1 
already reliably predicted the US ‘blocks’ learning about CS2 in the second stage. The 
group that was not pre-exposed to CS1-US contingencies does, however, show strong 
CRs to CS2.  
Two related phenomena also demonstrate learning when, behaviourally 
speaking, no learning appears to have taken place. The first phenomenon is latent 
inhibition, which refers to the discovery that it takes significantly longer to generate 
conditioned responses to a CS if an animal is pre-exposed to that CS before the 
conditioning trials, compared to when no pre-exposure takes place (Lubow, 1973; 
Lubow & Moore, 1959). A subtly different phenomenon is learned irrelevance, which 
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occurs when an animal is pre-exposed to uncorrelated presentations of CSs and USs 
(so, unlike latent inhibition, there is pre-exposure to both CSs and USs but the CS 
does not reliably predict the US). Again, this kind of pre-exposure retards subsequent 
learnt responses from correlated CS-US presentations (Mackintosh, 1973). Both of 
these phenomena reiterate that the overall power of a CS to predict a US is crucial (in 
both cases pre-exposure reduces the overall correlation between the CS and US), but 
also that animals can learn about the absence of relationships (Mackintosh, 1973, for 
example, believed that pre-exposure to uncorrelated CS-US presentations harmed 
learning because the animal learns that the CS is irrelevant). 
Another moderator of learnt responses occurs when the CS is presented in 
compound with a stimulus that already has an inhibitory relationship with the US. 
Imagine in a training phase an animal experiences a stimulus (A) in the presence of 
an outcome (say, shock); they also experience this same stimulus at the same time 
as another stimulus (B) and the absence of shock. Given that A reliably predicts 
shock, B will form an inhibitory relationship with shock (i.e. the organism will learn 
that B predicts absence of shock). The organism now experiences this inhibitory 
stimulus, B, alongside a new stimulus, C, in the presence of the shock US. Given that 
B already has a negative relationship with the CS, the new stimulus should acquire a 
magnified conditioned response to the US compared to if that CS had been presented 
in isolation with the US. This phenomenon is known as super-learning (see M. R. F. 
Aitken, Larkin & Dickinson, 2000; Rescorla, 1971). Super-learning again suggests that 
learning history has implications for the strength of magnitude of an acquired fear 
response: if at the time at which a CS becomes associated with trauma an inhibitory 
stimulus (one which has a negative prior relationship with trauma) is present also 
then it would be reasonable to expect a much greater acquired fear response.   
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These characteristics of conditioning clearly demonstrate that organisms enter 
conditioning episodes with information about prior experience and prior relationships 
between CSs and USs. In clinical terms this means that the power of a particular 
conditioning episode will depend, to some extent, on prior experience. Let’s take an 
example of a girl who sees a wasp land on her hand and is then stung. Prior exposure 
to a potential phobic stimulus in the absence of any biologically significant outcome 
(or the presence of a positive outcome) will protect that animal from learning aversive 
responses in a subsequent traumatic conditioning episode (latent inhibition). In this 
example, prior (non-traumatic) exposure to wasps should protect the girl from 
acquiring a fear of wasps after being stung. Likewise, uncorrelated pre-exposure to 
trauma and the phobic stimulus will weaken future associations between the two 
(learned irrelevance). Prior experience of trauma in the absence of the potential 
phobic stimulus should lead to an inhibitory relationship, which again will protect that 
stimulus from becoming a phobic stimulus. If the girl has been stung many times 
before but has not known what stung her or has associated the sting with different 
unrelated stimuli, then this should weaken the association between wasps and trauma 
after she sees the wasp sting her. Blocking also implies that existing relationships 
between a stimulus and a trauma should retard future stimuli from acquiring aversive 
CRs from the same trauma. For example, if she already associates similar painful bites 
with another animal then this should block the association between the wasp and 
trauma. Finally, super-learning can explain individual differences in acquired fear: the 
extent to which a fear CR is acquired depends on contextual variables at the time of 
learning. For example, if the girl is playing with her pet cat (a stimulus not predictive 
of trauma) at the time when she sees the wasp sting her then she should acquire a 
greater fear CR to the wasp than if she had not been playing with her cat. 
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All of this evidence explains why people who experience the same trauma differ 
in their acquisition of fears: because they have different conditioning histories, both 
with the trauma itself, and the stimulus with which it was paired. The other 
implication is that fear acquisition through conditioning processes is more likely to 
happen at younger ages because learning histories become more varied and complex 
as an organism gets older. To use the example above, ceteris paribus, a girl of eight 
years old has had more time have experienced wasps, experienced them more often 
and acquired a positive learning history that will be longer and more protective than a 
girl of 1 year old. 
Having looked at the impact of events before conditioning, I will now focus on 
the impact of events during conditioning. 
Conditioning Does Not Depend Upon Contiguity 
Rescorla (1988) also noted that there are widely-held misconceptions about the 
conditions under which conditioning occurs. It is widely acknowledged that temporal 
contiguity between the CS and US is a central concept in conditioning (in clinical terms 
the potential phobic stimulus should occur at the same time as a traumatic event); 
however, it is less widely acknowledged that contiguity is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for conditioning to occur. Rescorla (1968) conducted a study using two 
conditions that had identical pairings of a tone CS with a shock US (see A and B of 
Figure 2). However, in one of the conditions the shock US was also presented in 
between conditioning trials (A in figure 2). As such, the contiguity between the CS and 
US was identical in the two conditions, but they differed in terms of the information 
that the CS provided about the US: in one condition the CS perfectly predicted the US 
but in the other the likelihood of the US occurring when the CS was present was equal 
to the likelihood of the US when the CS was absent. In this later condition, no 
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conditioned responding was found demonstrating that conditioned responding is 
sensitive to the base rate of the US. Put another way, the predictive power of the CS 
is key, not the contiguity. This evidence suggests that base rate experience of the 
trauma will have an impact on its power to ‘create’ phobic stimuli. 
Contiguity is not only insufficient, it is actually unnecessary! The earlier 
discussion of super-learning referred to inhibitory relationships in which a stimulus 
predicts the absence of a US. These inhibitory relationships demonstrate that 
contiguity is unnecessary. Imagine a situation in which a group experiences the US 
only when the CS is not present (see C in Figure 2). The expectation, based on simple 
contiguity, is that nothing is learned in this situation. As we have already seen, the 
animal does learn something: it learns that there is a negative relation between the 
CS and the US. This phenomenon is known as conditioned inhibition. So, even in the 
absence of CS-US contiguity, animals learn something. 
Conditioning Can Occur After Only 1 Trial 
 Another misconception about conditioning is that it occurs over many trials. This 
view is problematic for conditioning models of fear acquisition because it is unlikely 
that an organism would have repeated exposure to a particular stimulus and the same 
traumatic outcome (it would be a very unlucky person who experienced a traumatic 
outcome every time they saw a spider!). However, conditioned responses can be 
acquired very rapidly: for example, Rescorla (1980) has demonstrated conditioned 
responding in only 8 trials. Even 8 trials though is a lot in terms of phobia acquisition: 
the assumption is that fear is acquired in a single trial. Nevertheless, there is evidence 
of one-trial learning especially when the outcome is aversive: Garcia, McGowan and 
Green (1972) have shown one-trial learning using illness and shock as an aversive US 
(see also Izuierdo, Barros, Medina & Izquierdo, 2000; Izuierdo, Barros, Ardenghi et 
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al., 2000); Campbell, Sanderson and Laverty (1964) demonstrated conditioned 
responses in humans when respiratory paralysis was used as a US; and most 
relevant, Öhman, Eriksson and Olofsson (1975) showed one-trial learning to both 
fear-relevant (snakes) and fear-irrelevant (houses) stimuli when shock was used as a 
US. These studies demonstrate that conditioned responses to stimuli co-occurring with 
an aversive outcome can be established in one trial. 
Associations Formed after 1 Trial are Persistent 
Perhaps more compelling evidence of one-trial learning comes from Rescorla’s 
(2000) demonstration that even when CSs and USs are randomly presented learning 
takes place: CS-US associations are formed very early and rapidly as are CRs, 
however, as training continues the CS loses its power to evoke a CR, but the CS-US 
associations remain intact. This finding is particularly interesting because it implies 
that CS-US associations form in very few trials and even subsequent random 
presentation of the CS and US does not eliminate the association between the two. 
The first implication is that a stimulus-trauma association can be created very quickly 
(in a single trial). The second, more subtle, implication is that the absence of a 
behavioural manifestation of the stimulus-trauma association (i.e. anxiety) cannot be 
taken as evidence that the association has not been formed, or that this association 
could not have a behavioural effect at some later stage. In fact, given that this 
association is resistant to subsequent random experience with the CS and US, then 
even in cases in which a person re-experiences the phobic stimulus or the trauma in 
the absence of the other, the initial association between the two will not be 
diminishedi and may acquire the power to evoke a CR at some later time. We shall 
return to this point. 
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The CR and UR are not necessarily the same 
Another common misconception about conditioning is that the conditioned 
response is the same as the unconditioned response. The reason why this belief is 
held is probably because in classic studies such as the little Albert study, and Pavlov’s 
original experiments (Pavlov, 1927), the CR and UR were the same. In fact, early 
theories of classical conditioning suggested that the CS becomes a substitute for the 
US and so the response elicited by the US is transferred to the CS (stimulus 
substitution). However, subsequent work has shown that the CS can elicit several 
responses that are relevant to the US, but are not necessarily the same as the 
response elicited by the US: for example, rats respond to aversive outcomes such as 
shock with behaviours such as increased heart rate, squeaking, and jumping, whereas 
a CS paired with this shock comes to elicit the opposite anticipatory responses such as 
a decrease in heart rate and ‘freezing’ (Black, 1971).  
Also, different CSs conditioned to the same US can produce different CRs: Pinel 
and Treit (1979) report that if a tone CS predicts a shock US then freezing occurs as 
already described, however, if a localised prod is used as a CS to the same shock US, 
then the CS comes to evokes behaviours aimed at burying the prod. The implication 
for conditioning accounts of phobias is that for any given phobic stimulus, the 
experiences at the time of conditioning may not be as simple as experiencing that 
stimulus during a traumatic event and subsequently feeling anxiety. The CR a person 
experienced may only be related to anxiety rather than being anxiety itself, and will 
depend on the CS and the US. As such, retrospective studies (in adults and children) 
of whether conditioning led to fear are likely to underestimate conditioning 
experiences simply because they present phobics with an inaccurate and over-
simplified explanation of the type of experience they should be reporting. 
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The CS Does Not Always Produce a CR Following Conditioning  
Rescorla (1991) has also demonstrated that if a CS is reinforced if, and only if, it 
is accompanied by another stimulus (called a ‘feature’), the conditioned responses 
likewise occur only if that feature is present. This phenomenon is called feature 
modulation or occasion setting. Feature modulation again emphasises the point made 
earlier that conditioning does not occur in a vacuum but is dependent on context. The 
first important implication for clinical accounts of phobia acquisition is that feature 
modulation can, perhaps, explain differences between subjective experiences of 
stimuli following conditioning. For some people conditioning may occur in the presence 
of a modulating stimulus: if this modulating stimulus is absent in subsequent 
encounters with the CS then conditioning theory predicts that no CR should occur. As 
such, although a CS-US association has been formed, it has no behavioural impact 
because the modulating stimulus is never encountered. Conversely, if at the time of 
conditioning there is no modulating stimulus, or the modulating stimulus is one highly 
likely to co-occur with the CS, then subsequent encounters with the CS should 
produce anxiety. For example, a boy who embarrasses himself during a school play 
may not develop general social anxiety because the context in which learning took 
place was so unusual. However, he may develop anxiety specifically about performing 
in school plays. The second implication is that treatment programs must aim to 
discover if such moderators exist, and if they do exposure to the CS should be done 
within the context of the moderator (see Bouton, Mineka & Barlow, 2001). 
A second, better-known, phenomenon is that of overshadowing in which a 
compound CS (i.e. two stimuli presented at the same time) is conditioned to a US. In 
subsequent presentations of the stimuli that made up the compound CS it is only the 
more salient of the two that will evoke a CR: responses to the less salient stimuli are 
overshadowed. The important point here is that there is a tendency to assume that 
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conditioning takes place between one stimulus (viewed as a whole) and another (also 
viewed as a whole) and yet a given stimulus is a combination of many features. In 
fact, conditioning is not simply the association of one stimulus with another, but the 
association of stimulus features with other stimulus features (see the section on 
conditioning being driven by CS-US associations). As such, fear may be evoked by 
quite specific features of the CS and conditioned responding during subsequent 
exposure to phobic stimuli will be modulated by the degree to which these features 
are present in that particular exemplar of the object. 
Conditioning Can Occur Without an Actual CS and US 
As ridiculous as it might sound, recent evidence suggests that conditioned 
responses can be acquired (using flavour CSs) without the CS or US being present at 
the time of learning: all that is required is a mental representation of these stimuli. 
Learning from representations rather than actual stimuli has been shown in two ways. 
First, when a mental representation of a CS is evoked in the absence of the actual 
stimulus and is paired with a US, the CS acquires a conditioned response. Second, if a 
mental representation of a stimulus (CS1) is paired with a second stimulus (CS2), 
which has previously been paired with a US and hence should evoke a mental 
representation of it, then CS1 acquires a conditioned response. The implication is that 
learning has occurred in the absence of both the CS and US:  a representation of the 
CS has been paired with a representation of the US (see Dwyer, 1999, 2001, 2003; 
Dwyer, Mackintosh & Boakes, 1998). Although more work needs to be done to see 
whether these effects extend beyond flavours, these findings have important 
implications for conditioning accounts of fear acquisition. First, it implies that it may 
be possible to acquire a conditioned anxiety response to a stimulus without 
experiencing that stimulus at the time of trauma: all that is necessary is that the 
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person is thinking about the stimulus at the time of the trauma. Second, it may be 
possible to acquire a conditioned fear response merely by thinking about a stimulus 
and a traumatic event simultaneously.  
A related phenomenon is second-order conditioning (Rescorla, 1980): once a 
predictor can elicit a reliable CR through its association with another stimulus, that 
predictor can act as outcome for other potential predictors. This phenomenon can be 
demonstrated using the following procedure: (1) CS1 (e.g. a bell) is paired with an 
outcome (e.g. shock) until it reliably evokes a response (anxiety); (2) a second 
predictor, CS2 (e.g. a light), is paired with CS1 (the bell); (3) CS2 is presented alone 
and is found to elicit a CR (anxiety) despite having never been directly paired with a 
US (shock). The second predictor comes to elicit a response because it is associated 
with CS1, which in turn is associated with an aversive outcome. Although there are 
many possibilities (and some conflicting evidence – see Davey, 1989b) regarding what 
associations govern responding to CS2 there is some evidence in humans that 
devaluing the US eliminates CRs to CS2 (Davey & McKenna, 1983). This finding 
suggests that CS2 forms a direct association to the original US that was paired with 
CS1; implying that when CS1 and CS2 are paired, CS1 evokes a representation of the 
US that becomes associated with CS2. The aforementioned evidence that US 
representations are sufficient to uphold conditioning is consistent with this possibility.  
The evidence in this section supports the idea that fear acquisition can occur 
through more complex scenarios than simply experiencing a stimulus in the presence 
of trauma. Specifically, stimuli can become associated with aversive USs without ever 
occurring in the presence of that US, all that is required is that they are experienced 
in the presence of a representation of an aversive US (a representation that may or 
not be evoked by a different CS). In these circumstances a person would have no 
memory of the object of their fear co-occurring with a traumatic event because it 
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never did (but the acquired fear still stems from conditioning processes). As such, 
these possibilities go some way to explaining why phobia sufferers often do not 
remember explicit conditioning episodes.  
The US need not be biologically significant 
Typically, USs are defined as a biologically significant event (because they evoke 
an unconditioned response). However, humans can readily associate stimuli, without 
one of them needing to evoke an unconditioned response. For example, studies of 
causal learning show that humans can learn predictive relations between neutral 
stimuli and neutral outcomes (see De Houwer & Beckers, 2002; Dickinson, 2001; 
Shanks, Holyoak & Medin, 1996 for reviews). Examples of the paradigms used include 
predicting whether pictures of butterflies (CS) will mutate (US) when exposed to 
radiation (Collins & Shanks, 2002; Lober & Shanks, 2000) and whether certain foods 
(CS) predict an allergic reaction US (M. F. R. Aitken et al., 2000; Le Pelly & McLaren, 
2003). Note in both cases that the apparent US does not evoke an unconditioned 
response; the outcome of these learning trials is not a US in the traditional sense. 
Nevertheless, humans readily learn the contingencies in these tasks (e.g. they can 
accurately predict whether a butterfly will mutate or not after several trials on which 
they receive feedback about whether their predictions are correct). This form of 
learning can be successfully characterised as associative learning in which the cause 
acts as a CS and the outcome is viewed as a US (see Dickinson, Shanks & Evenden, 
1984). When characterised in this way and models of associative learning (notably the 
Rescorla-Wagner and Mackintosh models described later) are applied, many aspects 
of the data accurately fit predictions from these models (De Houwer & Beckers, 2002; 
Dickinson, 2001; Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003; Lober & Shanks, 2000). For example, 
phenomena such as the importance of statistical contingency between the CS and US 
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(Perales & Shanks, 2003), blocking (Dickinson et al., 1984; Dickinson, 2001), learnt 
inhibition and learning under negative contingency (Chapman & Robbins, 1990; 
Dickinson, 2001), and super-learning (M. R. F. Aitken et al., 2000; Dickinson, 2001) 
are found in causal learning tasks. 
Although this review is an over-simplified look at the vast literature on causal 
learning, the main point is that associative learning (or ‘conditioning’) applies not just 
to associations between neutral and biological significant events. Models of associative 
learning can be applied with some success to situations in which the US is innocuous, 
and there is no obvious CR (or UR for that matter). This observation is important 
because it shows the generality of this form of learning: throughout childhood many 
associations will be formed between potentially phobic stimuli and any number of 
seemingly innocuous USs (and resulting in no anxiety at the time the association is 
formed). Once formed, however, these associations may still have power to generate 
anxiety through processes such as US revaluation. These associations also seem, to 
some extent, to be governed by the same laws as traditional conditioning.  
So far I have described several phenomena relating to events prior to 
conditioning, and factors that influence learning during the conditioning episode itself. 
I now turn to the impact of events subsequent to a conditioning episode. 
Extinction Does Not Break the CS-US Association 
The finding described earlier that CS-US associations form very quickly and 
remain in tact even after random CS-US presentations has interesting implications for 
extinction, in which the CS is presented alone resulting in a gradual decline in the CR 
until it is no longer evoked at all. If CS-US associations survive random presentations 
then they should also survive extinction (even if the CR is extinguished). 
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There are two clinical issues related to extinction. The first is that conditioning 
models of fear have been criticised because they predict extinction of fear responses, 
yet this is not seen in phobics. The idea behind this criticism is that having been 
unlucky enough to be on a ship that sunk (as in Yule et al., 1990) in all probability 
subsequent encounters with ships will not be accompanied by traumatic outcomes so 
the anxiety CR should decline. The second issue is that having been treated through 
exposure therapy (which is in its simplest form is a series of extinction trials) anxiety 
sometimes returns. 
The lack of extinction seen subsequent to traumatic conditioning episodes can be 
explained by avoidance: the children in Yule at al. (1990) who acquired anxiety about 
boats would be likely to avoid travelling on them subsequently and therefore never 
experience ships in the absence of trauma. We have also seen that a US need not be 
a real object: a mental representation is sufficient. This too explains a lack of 
extinction and possibly even incubation: when the fear-evoking stimulus is 
encountered it evokes a mental representation of the traumatic event that maintains 
the fear response. 
The issue that anxiety can return after extinction arises out of another 
misconception about conditioning: that extinction is forever. In fact, recent research 
into extinction is completely consistent with the view that CS-US associations not only 
survive subsequent random CS-US presentations (as described earlier) but also 
survive extinction procedures (see Bouton, 1994). So, even though conditioned 
responding to a CS declines over presentations of the CS in the absence of the US, 
several phenomena suggest that the underlying CS-US association survives.  
The renewal effect occurs when conditioning (e.g. a tone CS with a shock US) is 
conducted in one context (for example a specific location), but extinction trials (the 
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tone alone) are conducted in a different context. CRs to the tone extinguish, however, 
if the extinguished tone is presented in the original context (the context in which it 
was conditioned), the extinguished response is renewed. This effect can be very 
strong:  Going back to the children in Yule et al. (1990), the obvious implication is 
that the association between boats and the traumatic event will stay intact even if 
subsequent encounters with boats are not accompanied by trauma, provided these 
encounters are in a different context. 
 The second phenomenon is reinstatement which describes the finding that 
subsequent to extinction trials, if the US is presented again on its own, CRs are 
reinstated upon subsequent presentation of the CS. Again, reinstatement suggests 
that the CS-US association survives extinction. However, as with renewal, this effect 
is context dependent: the CS must be experienced in the same context as the 
reinstating stimulus (the US) for reinstatement to work. In terms of fear acquisition 
reinstatement implies that even if anxiety CRs are extinguished, a subsequent 
experience of the original trauma could reinstate the conditioned anxiety response if 
the phobic stimulus is later experienced in the same context. 
The oldest phenomenon that demonstrates how CS-US associations survive 
extinction is spontaneous recovery, in which extinguished CRs return (at least 
partially) merely after the passage of time. Bouton and Swartzentruber (1991) view 
this effect as an example of renewal but in temporal rather than physical contexts. In 
essence, the idea is that the extinction trials occur in a different temporal context to 
conditioning (although, of course, the CS cannot be re-experienced in the original 
temporal context but in an entirely new context to both conditioning and extinction). 
In terms of the clinical profile of developing anxiety, it is clear that the prediction 
that anxiety CRs should diminish over subsequent exposure is not as simple as it first 
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seems. In fact, the extent to which anxiety should subside is dependent upon context, 
and the success of exposure therapy may also depend on matching the context of 
exposure to the context in which the initial conditioning occurred.  
Traumatic Incidents Might not be Traumatic at the Time 
If, as we have seen, stimulus-trauma associations can be formed very rapidly, 
and exist even when the CS does not have sufficient power to evoke a CR, or when 
the CR has been extinguished, then what does it take to re-evoke the CR? We saw at 
the beginning of this section that conditioned responses are driven by CS-US 
associations and that re-valuation of the US, therefore, can influence the CR. If a 
person has formed a stimulus-trauma association (that survives extinction and 
subsequent random exposure to the stimulus and/or trauma) then all it would take to 
re-evoke a conditioned response would be for the US to be revalued (see Davey, 
1997; Field & Davey, 2001). 
Davey and McKenna (1983) conditioned fear responses in humans and then 
exposed them to the US to allow participant’s fear to it to habituate. This habituation 
resulted in both a more favourable assessment of the US and a diminished CR when 
the CS was next presented. Conversely, Davey, De Jong and Tallis (1993) report the 
case of a person (L.L.) who experienced mild anxiety and intestinal unease (US) in 
social situations (CS). On one occasion while L.L. was at home and not anxious, 
similar symptoms of intestinal unease led to an uncontrollable attack of diarrhoea. 
This event re-valued the US (the negative consequences of intestinal unease were 
magnified) and in subsequent social contexts L.L. became extremely anxious and 
developed severe agoraphobic symptoms. 
There are two important points here (see Davey, 1997; Field & Davey 2001): (1) 
US revaluation rules out the need to find specific traumatic conditioning events in a 
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patient’s history because the US may become traumatic subsequent to the learning 
episode in which it was associated with the CS; and (2) US revaluation explains why 
some individuals can experience a stimulus in the presence of a traumatic event yet 
not develop phobic symptoms — because the traumatic event is subsequently 
devalued.  
Summary 
So far we have looked at some recent (and not so recent but poorly understood 
outside of the conditioning literature) phenomena of classical conditioning. The 
stereotyped view of conditioning presented at the start of this paper is hugely 
inaccurate: conditioning is not simply a response acquired through experiencing one 
stimulus in the presence of another. Instead it is a rich environment in which context, 
past experience, and cognition all play a part in learning. We now turn our attention to 
other pathways to fear and look at whether conditioning can inform us about these 
routes to anxiety. 
Vicarious Learning and Information 
One of the limitations of early conditioning models was that learning occurs 
through other processes such as vicarious learning and information. The assumption 
here is that these pathways operate in different ways to direct conditioning (i.e. the 
underlying mechanism is different). However, this assumption is not necessarily true. 
In vicarious learning, a person experiences a stimulus (a CS) and someone else’s 
reaction to it. Mineka and Cook (1993) suggest that in such a learning episode the 
observed reaction to the CS acts as a US (that is, someone else’s distress is itself 
anxiety-evoking). As such, the observer experiences the CS in the presence of an 
anxiety-evoking event (someone else’s distress). In which case, observational 
learning is procedurally the same as so-called direct conditioning. Mineka and Cook 
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also present evidence suggesting that observer Monkeys do exhibit fear responses 
(unconditioned responses) to other Monkey’s distress, which supports the idea that 
other’s fear responses can act as a fear-evoking US. 
A second possibility is that vicarious learning represents a form of second-order 
conditioning (see above). In this interpretation, a person’s fear response is actually a 
CS which has acquired a fear-evoking quality through some prior co-occurrence with a 
traumatic event (US). The observational learning episode itself is, therefore, the co-
occurrence of a new CS2 with the CS1 of the fear response. As such, a stimulus (CS2) 
acquires a second-order fear response through co-occurrence with a fear response 
which has previously been associated with a traumatic outcome. Unfortunately, there 
is no available evidence to distinguish these two interpretations of what occurs in 
observational learning (see Mineka & Cook, 1993). However, for the purposes of this 
review all that is important is that vicarious learning is a form of conditioning at the 
procedural level and the associative structure of a vicarious learning episode can be 
conceptualised in the same way as a direct conditioning episode.   
In terms of how children acquire fear, very few studies have addressed the issue. 
Gerull and Rapee (2002) showed that toddlers would show greater fear expressions 
and avoidance of novel stimuli if their mothers had previously displayed negative 
facial expressions towards those stimuli. However, this study was not intended to look 
at the underlying mechanism of this learning. Recent work from our own laboratory 
(Askew, Zioga & Field, 2004) is looking at these mechanisms by using a paradigm in 
which 7-9 year old children are shown pictures of 3 novel Australian marsupials (CSs) 
presented on a computer screen alongside either pictures of smiling or fearful facial 
expressions (the third marsupial is not paired with any CSs and acts as a control for 
exposure). Initial results suggest that such pairings can produce changes in children’s 
self-reported fear beliefs about the animals and produce reliable differences in 
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attitudes to the animals when measured using reaction-time based tasks such as 
affective priming. The interesting thing about this paradigm is that comparisons to the 
animal that does not enter into an association with a US (and also comparisons with 
non-paired control groups) indicate that the changes are caused by a CS-US 
association: The results reflect associative learning. As such, like ‘direct’ conditioning, 
observational learning appears to be driven by CS-US associations. However, these 
studies have looked only at changes in subjective fear beliefs and so are still a step 
removed from showing acquired physiological fear. 
All of this evidence suggests that vicarious learning can be conceptualised as a 
conditioning procedure and is driven by CS-US associations; however, more research 
is needed to determine whether it conforms to the same rules as so-called direct 
conditioning. 
The second indirect pathway to fear (Rachman, 1977) is fear acquired through 
verbal information. Up until recently the evidence for the role of fear information in 
fear acquisition was based on retrospective reports in which adult phobic patients are 
asked to assign their learning experiences to one of the three pathways some 10-20 
years after the onset of their phobia. Although such studies support the role of fear 
information in the development of fears (see King et al., 1998;  Merckelbach, De Jong, 
Muris & Van den Hout, 1996, for reviews), these reports will be prone to memory bias 
and forgetting of potentially important learning episodes and typically rely on 
questionnaires such as the Phobic Origin Questionnaire (Öst & Hugdahl, 1981), which 
fails to identify components of the conditioning process resulting in misattributions of 
the cause of phobia (see Menzies and Clarke, 1994). These studies also force 
respondents to classify learning episodes as belonging to prescribed categories of 
learning experience (such as direct conditioning, vicarious learning and verbal 
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information). Such retrospective studies also say little about the mechanism 
underlying the effect of fear information. 
Recently, our laboratory has investigated the effects of negative information 
about novel animals in children. Field, Argyris & Knowles (2001) developed a 
prospective paradigm for looking at the effects of fear information in the development 
of animal fear beliefs in children: in two experiments 7–9 year olds received either 
positive or negative verbal information about previously un-encountered toy 
monsters. The results showed that children’s self-reported fear beliefs about the 
monster about which they had received negative information significantly increased. 
Similar results were found when the paradigm was adapted to look at social rather 
than animal fear beliefs (Field, 2002; Field, Hamilton, Knowles & Plews, 2003). Field 
and Lawson (2003) refined the paradigm by using real animals (3 Australian 
marsupials: the quoll, quokka and cuscus) that were unfamiliar to children in the UK, 
as stimulus materials. For a particular child, one of the animals was associated with 
positive information, one was associated with negative information and they were 
given no information about the third (which acted as a control). In these studies, 
negative information significantly increased children’s fear beliefs as indexed by self-
report, implicit measures of the beliefs (the implicit association task) and behavioural 
avoidance as measured by reluctance to approach a box inside which the animal was 
believed to be. Muris, Bodden, Merckelbach, Ollendick & King (2003) have also shown 
in a similar paradigm that the effect of negative information persisted a week after it 
was given and Field, Lawson and Banerjee (2004) have shown that both implicit and 
explicit fear beliefs can last up to 6 months. In addition, Field (2004) reported data 
suggesting that actual fear increased too in a behavioural task following negative 
information (relative to the control animal). This body of work, although still in its 
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infancy, shows that fear information can change fear beliefs, produces behavioural 
avoidance, and increases actual fear. 
The next issue is how fear information has its effect. Associative learning is a 
prime mechanism to explain how fear information operates. In the studies above, the 
novel animal is a CS, and the information a US. Typically, USs are defined a 
biologically significant, so in a strict conditioning sense, the information would need to 
be fear-evoking. As yet, there is no evidence that the information given in these 
studies is fear evoking (in fact, the content of the information is highly unlikely to be 
fear-evoking) which suggests that conditioning models cannot be applied in this 
situation. However, as we saw in the previous section, conditioning models can also 
explain causal learning in humans – in which USs are not biologically significant. It is 
plausible, therefore, to consider that throughout childhood, a child experiences many 
causal learning/conditioning trials in which a stimulus (such as an animal) consistently 
predicts negative information (‘don’t touch that’, ‘be careful of the animal’ ‘that animal 
bites’). These experiences are directly analogous to the type of experiences in human 
causal learning experiments: a potentially phobic stimulus acts as a CS and negative 
information as a US. Procedurally this situation is conditioning – it results from the 
pairing of a stimulus with an outcome. At the effect level too, it is conditioning: the 
beliefs or behaviours are acquired through the pairing of a stimulus with some 
meaningful information about it. 
If we consider fear information as having its effect through associative learning 
then the first implication is that if the negative information gets revalued in some way 
(perhaps by some salient experience such a friend being bitten by the animal) then 
through its association with the animal CS, conditioned anxiety could emerge 
(remember that in direct conditioning studies, if an innocuous US is revalued in this 
way a CS that previously did not have the power to evoke a measurable CR can come 
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to evoke one). The second implication is that fear information should exhibit the other 
functional characteristics of direct conditioning. For example, the base rate of 
information should be important, positive information should protect against 
subsequent negative information (latent inhibition) and so on. Research is ongoing to 
see if this is the case, however, initial results do suggest that, consistent with models 
of associative learning, acquired fear beliefs are sensitive to the statistical contingency 
between a novel animal and negative information (Field, 2005). 
In this section we have seen that the effects of both vicarious learning and 
negative information of the development of fear are procedural examples of 
conditioning. We have also explored the possibility that both are forms of associative 
learning. In both cases there is initial evidence that they show some of the 
characteristics that would be expected if they are governed by the same underlying 
mechanism as so-called direct conditioning. Although only time will reveal whether 
these ‘indirect pathways’ can be fully described by models of associative learning, I 
hope to have convinced you that there are good reasons to suppose that they might. 
If you accept this possibility then, remembering that 94% of anxious children and 
their parents endorsed direct conditioning or one of these indirect pathways as an 
explanation for their fear, then associative learning is an extremely good prospect for 
a mechanism that underlies the acquisition of fear. 
Models of Conditioning/Associative Learning 
Assuming you are suitably convinced of the merits of conditioning theory as an 
explanation of developing fears, it is worth looking as some of the popular models and 
what they imply for fear acquisition. This section reviews some of the most popular 
models of the past 30 years but is by no means exhaustive. 
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The Rescorla-Wagner (1972) Model 
    Rescorla and Wagner (1972) proposed a model of conditioning that, in 
essence, is based on processing of the US. The model formalises the idea that 
associations are formed between cues and surprising outcomes and incorporates a 
term representing a cue’s individual associability, which represents an individual 
learning rate that stems from differential attention. The model is formalised in the 
following equation: 
( )∑−=∆ VV AA λβα  
This equation simply means that the change in associative strength of a given 
cue or CS (∆VA) is a function of the intensity or salience of the cue itself (αA), known 
as its associability, and the intensity of the US (β). The crucial part of the equation is 
the part in parenthesis, which reflects the difference between the maximum 
associative strength that the US can support (i.e. the maximum amount of 
conditioning possible with a given US, λ) and the sum of the associative strengths of 
all cues presented on the trial (ΣV). This summed error term allows the model to 
explain cue competition effects such as blocking: in initial training stages the first cue, 
A, will acquire associative strength up to the maximum allowed by the US (λ), then in 
the second stage, the amount of associative strength gained by the second cue B 
depends upon the discrepancy between the amount of conditioning supported by the 
US (λ) and the summed associative strength of A and B (ΣV). The pre-training of A to 
its maximum associative strength means that the summed associative strength of A 
and B will equal the amount of conditioning supported by the US (λ = ΣV), and the 
discrepancy between the two is, therefore, zero. The end result is the associative 
strength acquired by B will also be zero: a blocking effect. 
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In clinical terms, this model summarises some important characteristics. The 
change in associative strength of a potentially-phobic stimulus will depend on several 
things. First, it will depend upon the intensity of the US (β): more traumatic 
experiences should support greater fear acquisition. Second, it will depend upon the 
salience of the potentially-phobic stimulus (αA), which itself could be influenced by any 
number of factors such as novelty, and prior information. Finally, it will depend on the 
extent to which it is presented with other cues that already have some associative 
connection to the US (cue competition effects). 
Mackintosh’s (1975) Model  
Mackintosh (1975), in a seminal paper, extended the Rescorla-Wagner model to 
suggest that the attention devoted to a given cue is a function of its importance in 
predicting an outcome: that is, animals will attend to relevant stimuli at the expense 
of not attending to irrelevant ones. In this sense, Mackintosh’s model rather than 
looking at US-processing focuses on CS-Processing. The model can be formalised as 
follows: 
( )AAA VV −=∆ λβα  
in which VA is the existing associative strength of the cue. The key to this model, 
as I’ve already suggested, is that the associability of the cue (αA) is not constant as in 
the Rescorla-Wagner model, but updates as a function of the degree to which that cue 
predicts the outcome relative to any other cues presented on the same trial. If the cue 
is better than all other predictors then αA will remain high, but if there are better 
predictors within the environment then αA will decrease. These ideas are formalised as 
follows: 
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The first equation simply means that for a given trial, n, the salience of the CS 
on that trial, nAα∆ , will be positive if the discrepancy between the maximum amount of 
conditioning possible (λn) and the associative strength of the CS on the previous trial 
( 1−nAV ) is smaller than the discrepancy between the maximum amount of conditioning 
possible and the associative strength of all other cues on the previous trial ( 1−nXV ). So, 
as the associative strength of the CS approaches the maximum (or is closer to the 
maximum for that CS than any other cues) then the salience of that CS increases. The 
second of the two equations means that for a given trial, n, the salience of the CS on 
that trial, nAα∆ , will be negative if the discrepancy between the maximum amount of 
conditioning possible (λn) and the associative strength of the CS on the previous trial 
( 1−nAV ) is greater than or equal to the discrepancy between the maximum amount of 
conditioning possible and the associative strength of all other cues on the previous 
trial ( 1−nXV ). Therefore, when the associative strength of the other cues is as close or 
closer to the maximum possible than the CS, then the salience of the CS will 
decrease. 
Kruschke (2001) has extended these ideas. He suggests that learning involves 
an attentional system that aims to implement the assumption that any CS should 
receive some attention, and to decide how attention should be distributed over 
multiple CSs. Finite attentional resources are assumed so increased attention to one 
CS necessarily implies less attention to another. The system receives feedback and 
shifts attention in such a way as to reduce error, these shifts in attention lead to 
changes in the association weights (of the CSs), which themselves act to reduce the 
error in learning.  
These attentional models explain failures to learn such as blocking: after pre-
training, the first CS is known to predict the US reliably and, therefore, it attracts 
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most or all of the attentional resources when it is presented alongside a second CS. As 
such, the second CS receives little or no attention and no learning about it takes place 
(Krushke & Blair, 2000; Mackintosh, 1975).  
The Pearce-Hall (1980) Model 
Mackintosh’s model has some problems in explaining phenomena such as latent 
inhibition, which led to Pearce and Hall (1980) to propose an alternative model which 
like, Mackintosh’s model is based on CS-processing. However, they viewed learning in 
completely the opposite way to Mackintosh arguing that attention would not be placed 
on CSs that reliably predict a US, but instead would be given to stimuli about which 
the predictive significance was unclear. The rationale was that it is costly to expend 
resources on stimuli already known to predict an outcome, when those resources 
could be allocated to trying to establish the significance of the ‘unknowns’ in the 
environment. In this model, different equations determine the change in associative 
strength depending on whether the trial is excitatory (CS-US) or inhibitory (CS-No 
US). For excitatory trials, the change in associative strength is determined by a 
function of a learning rate parameter related to US Intensity (βE), the maximum 
possible conditioning (λn) and the associative strength of the CS on the previous trial 
( 1−nAα ): 
nn
AE
n
AV λαβ 1−=∆  
In inhibitory trials, the change in associative strength is determined by a function 
of a learning rate parameter related to US Intensity (βI), the associative strength of 
the CS on the previous trial ( 1−nAα ), and the discrepancy between the maximum 
possible conditioning (λn) and the extent to which a US is predicted by all stimuli 
presented on that trial (∑
−1n
NETV ). 
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( )∑ −− −=∆ 11 nNETnnAEnA VV λαβ  
Having determined the change in associative strengths on a given trial, the 
associability (salience) of a given CS is determined by: 
( ) 11 1 −− −+−= ∑ nnNETnnA V αγλγα  
In which γ is a parameter lying between 0 and 1 that defines the degree to which 
associability is governed by the preceding trial (γ = 1 when the previous trial is solely 
responsible for the salience of the CS) or by earlier trials (γ = 0 when the salience of 
the CS is solely determined by earlier trials and not the directly preceding one). 
Hybrid Models 
Both the Rescorla-Wagner and Mackintosh models have their problems (Le 
Pelley, 2004; Pearce & Bouton, 2001) and subtle modifications have been made (see 
De Houwer & Beckers, 2002; Pearce & Bouton, 2001). The Rescorla-Wagner model 
breaks down by assuming that the individual associative strength of cues is 
unimportant and that all that matters is the combined associative strength. 
Mackintosh’s model does not have this problem because it does not rely on a summed 
error term but instead views cue competition in terms of associability (rather than 
error). However, by not using a summed error term Mackintosh’s model is unable to 
explain conditioned inhibition (when there is a negative relation between the CS and 
US). These problems have recently led to the development of hybrid models such as 
that by Le Pelley (2004). The technicalities of this model are beyond the scope of this 
article, but in essence it combines features of the Rescorla-Wagner, Mackintosh and 
Pearce-Hall models. The end result is a model that has at its core both CS (attentional 
as in Mackintosh’s model and salience as in Pearce-Hall’s model) and US processing 
(as in Rescorla-Wagner). This hybrid model allows explanations of learned irrelevance, 
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blocking, latent inhibition, conditioned inhibition, superconditioning and associative 
history (see Le Pelley, 2004, for further details). 
Conditioning and the Development, Treatment and Prevention of Anxiety 
This paper has reviewed some features of conditioning and has attempted to 
dispel the myth that conditioning explanations of fear simply involves isolated learning 
episodes that occur in an experiential vacuum. On the contrary, learning theory has 
developed, and continues to develop, rapidly and we now have elegant 
demonstrations in animals and humans that conditioning is a rich and complex system 
that allows organisms to learn predictive relationships within their environment. 
Conditioning can not only account for how fears might be acquired, but also offers a 
framework for understanding how associations between mental representations are 
formed that themselves may lead to fear. For example, an association between a 
novel animal and fear information may lead to an activation of a fear response if that 
fear information is subsequently revalued. Conditioning is also not incompatible with 
the idea that some stimuli may more readily acquire fear responses in that models of 
learning see stimulus salience as key in the associative processes. Social and cultural 
processes will contribute to the extent to which a stimulus grabs attention and is, 
therefore, associated with an outcome. Conditioning also can explain differences in 
fear acquisition in children experiencing similar events: learning history and 
contextual cues are both important in whether CS-US associations are formed and 
whether conditioned responses are activated by a CS. There are also now a range of 
models that summarise the wealth of knowledge about conditioning processes. These 
models offer predictive mechanisms through which fears are acquired (or at least a 
mathematical approximation of the biological mechanism in the brain). From these 
models come predictions about when fears will be acquired and how associations 
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between stimuli and trauma/negative information/vicarious experiences might be 
weakened and anxiety responses reduced. 
The importance of understanding underlying mechanisms of fear acquisition 
cannot be underestimated. First, understanding mechanisms that cause fears to 
develop has important implications for prevention and treatment because it opens up 
several avenues through which preventive/corrective measures can be taken. In 
terms of prevention and rapid intervention, our knowledge of conditioning and the 
models that describe it allow several predictions: 
1. The contingency between a CS and US is important: as such programs can 
be developed that actively attempt to reduce the contingency between a 
given stimulus and bad outcomes be they direct, vicarious or negative 
information. Exposure to or positive learning trials involving common fear-
evoking objects should reduce the impact of future learning episodes 
because the stimulus-bad outcome contingency will be weak. 
2. Learning history: related to the above, the earlier that such preventions 
are initiated the more successful they will be (because there is less chance 
of a negative learning history existing). 
3. Quick intervention: given that bad experiences do occur, parents and 
teachers might be encouraged to follow up bad experiences with positive 
ones. Again, this is important even if no behavioural anxiety is obvious 
because it will again weaken the stimulus-bad outcome association. For 
example, if a child is frightened by a dog jumping up then it should be 
beneficial to calm the dog and encourage the child to stroke it.  
4. Real CSs and USs are not necessary: The evidence suggesting that 
conditioning can occur using only mental representations of CSs and USs 
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opens up a range of prevention possibilities by using imagery, rather than 
real conditioning episodes. In the example of the dog frightening a child 
above, it may be sufficient to remind the child of past positive encounters 
with dogs, or to get them to think about or imagine those positive 
encounters. 
5. CS salience: if CS salience is important in learning then preventions can be 
aimed at devaluing the salience of particular stimuli. For example, 
following a negative learning experience, if a child strongly associated a 
single stimulus, A, with the trauma then drawing attention to other 
features that predicted the trauma should reduce the associative change 
that will occur to A in future negative episodes. This intervention should 
work because in effect you are reducing the discrepancy between A as a 
predictor of the outcome and other events as a predictor of the outcome in 
Mackintosh’s equations which will reduce the change in associative 
strength of A in subsequent trials). 
6. US devaluation: devaluing traumatic events quickly after they have 
happened may prevent anxiety from developing. For example, children 
who experienced a bad thunderstorm (e.g. Dollinger at al., 1984) might be 
reassured that storms of that magnitude are very rare and unlikely to 
happen again.   
We can also use this wealth of knowledge to inform treatments. 
1. Contextual cues: Although exposure and other interventions based on 
conditioning have already proved successful, it is clear that therapeutic 
interventions are relatively simplistic in that they are still based on the 
notion of a simple stimulus-trauma association. Given the complexities of 
39 
learning, more detailed accounts of learning histories may help to inform 
interventions. Of course, therapists already search for contextual cues and 
triggers, but realising that such cues fit into formalised models of learning 
can help therapists to make firm predictions about the effect of 
manipulating these contextual variables (or conditioned inhibitors). For 
example, exposure therapy using imagery for a child who is socially 
anxious because of a mistake in a school play will be most effective if the 
child imagines the hall, the stage and any other salient features from the 
time of the initial conditioning episode. Honing in on these contextual cues 
from the time when the fear was acquired could reduce the probability of 
renewal of the initial fear. 
2. Formulation: Conditioning may also be useful as a framework for 
explaining to patients or parents the kinds of processes involved in fear 
acquisition and how the various interventions have their effects. For 
example, it may be useful to explain the concept of spontaneous recovery 
to help explain setbacks in therapy. 
Of course, the bleaker picture is that we have evidence that CS-US associations 
are formed quickly and are difficult to break. This evidence leads to the pessimistic 
conclusion that whatever preventions and interventions we try, negative learning 
experiences will win through. Perhaps the way forward is to target common fears at 
very early ages to help built positive learning histories that will protect children from 
developing anxiety after at least some of the negative learning experiences that life 
brings. 
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Summary 
This paper has reviewed some of what is now known about phenomena and 
theories of conditioning (or associative learning) and has argued that it is a fruitful 
way to conceptualise how fears might develop. Not only do a broad range of learning 
phenomena conform to similar principles (human causal learning seems to obey 
similar rules to ‘basic’ conditioning in animals), but the various models of associative 
learning allow firm predictions about when and how fears might develop in children. 
By using conditioning as a framework for understanding direct fear acquisition, 
vicarious learning and fear information we stand some chance of gaining better insight 
into how to prevent and treat phobias. 
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FIGURES 
• Figure 1: Shows the stereotypical conditioning model of phobia acquisition 
using the example of Watson & Rayner (1920). A previously neutral stimulus, 
CS (a white rat) is paired with an aversive outcome, US (in this case a loud 
noise) which naturally evokes an anxiety response (UR). Through association 
with the aversive outcome, the CS comes to evoke an anxiety response (CR). 
• Figure 2: Time lines showing different levels of contiguity between a CS and a 
US. In A and B, the contiguity is the same (the CS and US always coincide), but 
A has a high base rate of the US (it also occurs in the absence of the CS). In C, 
there is no contiguity (the US occurs only when the CS is absent). 
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A) Contiguity with a 
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FOOTNOTES 
                                       
i However, the response to the CS will be diminished. 
